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Saul Kripke' s influential theory of reference examines the 
relationship between the name given to a referent and various 
descriptive statements that can be made aboutit. In this essay, 
I extend this theory of reference, as developed by Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam, in an effort to critique and also develop Eric 
Katz's argument in, "Organism, Community, and the 'Sub· 
stitution Problem'." 
I begin by explaining how Katz rejects an organism 
model of species within an ecosystem because it allows for 
the possibility of 'the substitution problem', and instead 
favors a community model of associated individuals who are 
valued both intrinsically and instrumentally. I then maintain 
that Katz's distinction between the organism and the COIn­
munity models is merely one of degree and is largely seman· 
tic. The difference between the models is the way in which 
they serve Katz's goal of differentiating between intrinsic 
and instrumental value. I analyze this goal within the context 
of Kripke' s theory of reference in a way that illumina tes some 
of the issues contributing to the dispute between valuing 
species intrinsically and instrumentally. Finally, I conclude 
that Katz's counterfactual exercise and 'the substitution prob­
lem'i if approached from the perspective of the Kripke's 
theory of reference, can bring to light new considerations for 
an ethic to address. 
Mitchell is a senior philosophy/political science major at Newcomb College, 
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Organism vs. Community 
To analyze Eric Katz's holistic environmental ethic, it is 
important first to understand his conceptual distinction be­
tween the organism and community metaphors often used to 
describe natural systems. In the next section, we will see tha t 
there are significant problems with this distinction. The 
organism model conceives of individual species as organs in 
a larger organism, organs that cannot exist apart from the 
organism. The community model conceives of individual 
species as members of a larger group, but also acknowledges 
that they have a measure of independence. For Katz, an 
organism model is not desirable because it fails to value a 
species for itself, intrinsically, and instead values a species 
solely in terms of its functional, instrumental worth (Katz 
249).1 Katz believes a feasible environmental ethic must 
establish an acceptable balance between and include both 
intrinsic and instrumental value. The community model, for 
Katz, seems to fill this requirement. 
Katz argues (incorrectly it would seem) thatthe organism 
model fails to strike this balance between values, because it 
imagines a species merely as a component, part, or unit 
whose IIexistence [in the natural system] is due to the con­
tinuous functioning of the organic whole of which they are a 
part" (Katz 245). A species is conceived of as an organ 
necessarily dependent upon all the other organs in the sys­
tem. By overemphasizing species' interdependence, Katz 
argues, the organism model denies a species' independence, 
its intrinsic value. The independence is lost, according to 
Katz because, "an entity valued intrinsically requires no 
relationship with any other entities" (Katz 249). But all 
species require relationships with other entities to survive. It 
seems that within this dependence there does exist an ele­
ment of value which is granted to the species itself, to its 
presence in the system as a whole; intrinsic value does seem 
to be present. 
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Katz argues that another undesirable result of the organ­
model is • the substitu tion problem'. If a species is valued 
only instrumentally, it is logically possible to replace that 
species with either another species or a machine capable of 
iuUilling its functional role in the natural system. Katz 
explains, "what is really important is the role, not the species" 
(Katz 251).: If this is true, the organism model allows for a 
species to be replaced without remorse] because what is most 
important is the ecosystemic organ, to which the species is 
whollv subservient. 
Eric Katz claims, however, that there is a model that 
successfully embraces both the intrinsic value of a species as 
well as the instrumental role it plays in the natural system. 
This model is that of the community, which "focuses on both 
functional value and autonomous intrinsic value of natural 
entities in a sy-steml) (Katz 241). In this model, an entity exists 
both as an individual (in its own right) and as a member 
(constituting a unit) of a functioning community. A species, 
as an entity in the community model, has a relatively inde­
pendent existence and value over and above its value as a 
member of the community. According to Katz this relatively 
independent status makes a species in this model"similar to 
an entity with intrinsic value; it possesses some value in itself 
without regard to other entities" (Katz249). Itis clear that this 
model solves 'the substitution problem' by recognizing that 
species cannot be conceived solely as a functional unit in an 
ecosystemic whole, by recognizing their intrinsic worth. In 
recognizing both instrumental and intrinsic value, this model 
creates the conw tions necessary for an effective environmen­
tal ethic which recognizes and protects a species both for 
itself and for its function. 
A Degree Relationship: Organism and Community 
Now that Katz's basic argument has been explicated, we 
can tum to an examination of its seemingly unfounded 
distinction followed by a Kripkean critique of this distinc­
tion. A close reading of the article shows that the difference 
57 THE VALUE OF NATURAL KINDS 
betweenan organism and a community is nothing more than 
a difference of degree, one that weights intrinsic and instru­
mental value. Therefore, Katz's criticism of the organism 
model in favor of a supposedly more balanced version, the 
communitymodel,is inaccurate insuggesting that the organ­
ism model wholly excludes intrinsic value. Katz acknowl­
edges thathis distinction is merely a semantic differentiation 
of degree in saying, 
the model of community permits the consideration of 
both intrinsic and instrumental value to a greater 
extent than the model of organism. Since anorganism 
is primarily concerned with the functions of interde­
pendent parts, itemphasizes instrumental value. (Katz 
249-50)3 
In saying that what is important is the extent to which 
value is acknowledged in the community model, Katz ex­
presses his displeasure with the lesser degree to which the 
organism model grants a species value. Katz favors an ethic 
with a more even balance of-values, both intrinsic and instru­
mental. But the organism model need not lack intrinsic value 
entirely. In advocating the community model as a balanced 
ethic, Katz makes it clear that a species necessarily has 
intrinsic value merely by virtue of being natural: 
[T]he intrinsic value of natural entities is their source 
or origin - what causes them to be what they are. A 
natural entity possesses intrinsic value to some extent 
because it is natural, an entity that arose through 
processes that are not artificially human. This 'natu­
ralness' is one of the properties that gives it its value. 
(Katz 254)4 
Evidently, it is not that the organism model overlooks or 

excludes intrinsic value, rather, Katz finds the degree to 

which that model acknowledges this value inadequate for 

forming abalanced environmental ethic. But because he has 

explicitly said that species have intrinsic value merely by 
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virtue ofbeingnatural, the substitution problem is a mislead­
ing construct. Substituting a species valued both instrumen­
tally and intrinsically, for that iswhatKatz claims a desirable 
ethicwould accomplish, would seem morally wrongevenfor 
a holist. If a species is valued intrinsically even to a dimin­
ished extent, then it would be hypocritical for the valuers to 
replace itwith another intrinsically valued entity, since sub­
stitution seems to presuppose thatneither the replaced species 
nor the one replacing it has intrinsic value. Hence the 'substi­
tution problem' amounts to a "straw man", since even most 
holists would balk at the idea that species are nothing but 
replaceable organs. 
Katz makes clear what aspects of an environmental ethic 
~e considers are important, namely, that it incorporate both 
intrinsic and instrumental value into its framework, thereby 
eliminating the possibility of the 'substitution problem' be­
ing actualized. In whatfollows, I show how Kripke's theory 
of reference can provide the basis for a thought experiment 
leading to such an ethic. In addition, I indicate why an 
application of Hilary Putnam's work with counterfactual 
worlds provides additional reasons why 'the substitution 
problem' is an implausible concern. Finally, I argue that their 
work can also give the sort of rationale for preservation that 
Katz believes a feasible ethic could provide. 
The Theory of Reference 
Kripke's theory of reference as explained in Naming and 
Necessity is concerned with the extent to which descriptions 
are related to names in the real world as well as in 
counterfactual worlds. In reworking reference theory, Kripke 
criticizes andultimately overcomes the previous conclusions 
concerning names and descriptions as suggested by such 
philosophers as Frege and Russell. Frege for example be­
lieves that names, spoken and written linguistic terms, are 
synonymous with their ontological II definite descriptions/' 
statements that can be made about a referent's properties. 
For Frege, names have the same meaning as descriptions; 
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that is, names can'stand in for' /,be substituted for' descrip­
tions. The particular description the speaker intends the 
name to stand for is used II to determine the referent of the 
name" (Kripke 28). 
By contrast, a name for Kripke is a rigid designator; that 
is, it is nothing more than a strict label or a tag given to a 
referent, to a unique identity. As Kripke states, "Let's call 
something a rigid designator if in every possible world it 
designates the same object ... [N]ames are rigid designators" 
(Kripke 48).5 The name, then, is rigidly tagged onto an object 
across all possible worlds. However, a description, inKripke' s 
theory of reference, is not synonymous with a name; that is, 
a description is not something that'stands for' a name or is 
equivalent to it. If a name is 'x' in a given sentence, then in 
Kripke's analysis, a description can not be substituted for'x' 
and still maintain the same meaning (Kripke 48).6 A descrip­
tion is a contingent statement from which a reference is fixed 
or determined. Hence, lithe description used is not synony­
mous with the name it introduces but rather fixes its refer­
ence" (Kripke 96n). 
In the new theory of reference, this description is most 
directly aimed at proper names. In cases involving individu­
als, the theory is easily applied, seeming almost 
commonsensical. Kripke gives many such examples, one of 
which concerns Aristotle. If the name i Aristotle' is the name 
affixed to a specific object, then the statement 'Plato' s greatest 
student' is, as a description, not a rigid designator but instead 
is a statement about the contingent properties associated 
with that name. It is contingent because if Aristotle were not 
Plato's greatest student he would still have been called 
, Aristotle'. The name is rigid, but the description in this case 
is not. 
Of special interest here is tl1e case inwhich a statement is 
a definite description which can be used to isolate I Aristotle' 
as a unique individual. Such a case would be a statement in 
which Aristotle were to state that he was born in'x' month to 
'such and such parents'. The descriptions in this case point 
only to the being named 'Aristotle' asa unique individual. In 
H. MITCHELL 
this caset the description indicates fundamental qualities/ 
essential properties that could only be held by one unique 
individuaL When essential properties are used in a descrip­
tive statement in this waYt that descriptiont tOOt is a rigid 
designator. Then and only thent just as a name wouldt the 
description tags the individual with its essential properties 
(Kripke 28). These essential properties are exclusively neces~ 
sary characteristics or scientific facts about the individual 
that are known definitely. 
Common Nouns and General N ames As They Are Associ­
ated With Natural Kinds 
Another interesting relationship between name and de­
scription that is especially significant in this analysis is how 
Kripkets theory of names applies to common nouns and 
general names. By applying the theory to a collection of 
individualst such as a speciest the theory of names becomes 
significant for environmental ethics. In these casest the name 
used represents a group that has some commonalityt unlike 
the previous cases where the names belonged to unique 
individuals. Within these cases His the class of general names 
associated with natural kinds - that iStwith classes of things 
that we regard as of explanatory importance; classes whose 
normal distinguishing characteristics are 'held together' or 
even explained by deep-Iyingmechanismll (Putnam 102). It 
becomes clear that when general names are usedt a wrinkle 
is added to Kripkets theory of reference. Do the individual 
members of the group lose some form of individuality by 
being represented by a collective rigid designator? Whatis the 
shared essence of the members in the group such that they can 
all be tagged by the same nameT What implications does this 
have for groups such as speciesl and how does this affect an 
environmental ethic? Hilary Putnam addresses many of 
these unanswerable questions inhis development of Kripkel s 
theory of reference as it applies to groups. 
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Putnam's investigation leads to a focus on essences of 
groups with something in common. As he explains, "what 
the essential nature is is not a matter of language analysis but 
of scientific theory construction .. ./1 (Putnam 105). Such 
scientific constructions would resemble chemical breakdowns 
or chromosomal structures of objects. Kripke suggests that, 
IIA priori, all we can say is that it is an empirical matter 
whether the characteristics originally associated with the 
kind apply to its members universally, or even ever, and 
whether they are in fact jointly sufficient for membership in 
the kind" (Kripke 137). As Putnam points out, there is one 
obvious problem with such essential descriptions. Because 
they represent a stereotype of the object, they do not account 
for abnormalities. Despite this drawback, these descriptions, 
have the status of rigiddesigna tion because they are based on 
as the actual nature of the particular things as they can be 
known by humankind. Kripke grants that, "In general, 
science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to 
find the nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical 
sense) [a priori] of the kind" (Kripke 138). 
An example of essence, understood as what a thing 
necessarily is according to science, is explained by Hilary 
Putnam in an article entitled "Meaning and Reference," 
Putnam complicates the theory of reference and names a 
hypothetical' substitution problem' in a counterfactual world. 
This world contains a liquid possessing the same superficial 
properties as Earth's water: "it is indistinguishable from 
water at normal temperatures and pressures," except it is 
composed of XYZ as opposed to H20 (Putnam 121b). The 
substance is knownas and called 'water' inthis counterfactual 
'Twin Earth' , but according to Putnam's analysis, largely 
based on Kripke's, this substance is notwater. It is a scientifi­
cally known fact that in our world 'H20 is water' is a true 
identity statement. That is, this statement is not contingently 
known because it is an identity statement between two 
names. In this case, if the statement"H20 =water" is true and 
if they are both names (that is, they are rigid designators), 
then "H20 =water" is a necessary truth. It is interesting to 
62 JESSICA H. MITCHELL 
note that even though the statement is not contingent, it still 
mustbe true aposteriori. Because this non-contingent claim is 
knownaposteriori it involves an element of uncertainty. Even 
though we know water to chemically be H20, it is possible in 
the future that, another scientifically determined composi­
tionwillbe discovered thatis more accurate. The new theory 
of reference, :insofar as it considers the essences of things, 
rests on the dynamic shoulders of empirical science. 
Species, Katz, and The New Theory of Reference 
Many of the above mentioned examples and concepts 
prove helpful when examining the main issues in Eric Katz's 
article. The implications of the new theory are important in 
giving additional reasons for the implausibility of/the substi­
tution problem' as well as for providing a basis for arriving 
at an environmental ethic similar to the I community model' 
from Katz's essay. 
The substitution problem, as was explained earlier, is not 
a plausible problem. If it is acknowledged that species have 
intrinsic value by virtue of being natural, as was suggested 
earlier, then it is not plausible that this"serious moral prob­
lem," of replacing intrinsically valued species with other 
entities capable of carrying out the original's understood 
function inan ecosystem, could arise. Indeed, Ka tz admits in 
his article that such a substitution has never really occurred. 
After suggesting that such a thing could happen, how­
ever, he also stated that if the substitution problem occurred 
itwould be morally wrong, because it directly"involves the 
ideas of identity, integrity, or intrinsic value applied to 
individual organisms and species" (Katz 253). He later says 
in the article, "a technically adequate functional substitute, 
because it is not an outgrowth of the original natural pro­
cesses of the system, does notpossess the same intrinsic value 
as the original entity" (Katz 254,245). Therefore, the identi­
ties of species are separate from and independent ofeach other. 
Such natural independence is in part why something is 
intrinsically valuable. This is very similar to the statement 
THE VALUE OF NATURAL KINDS 
describing Kripke' s conception of identities being a combina­
tion of origin and substance I both of which are essential. As 
Kripke surmises, "If a material object has its origin from a 
certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any 
other matter" (Kripke 114). Because Kripke considers origin 
andsubstanceuniquecharacteristicsofanindependentiden­
tHy, it seems that these are the elements that cause a being to 
be separate and independent. 
It follows that, even if some other entity or mechanical 
object were capable of replacing a species' functional rolet the 
replacement would never 'be' the species. It would not 
acquire the identity of the replaced species by mimicking the 
functional role. Hilary Putnam gives a concise accountofthis 
in the example of water onTwin Earth. Putnam explains that 
even if XYZ fulfills the"operational definition," that is, has 
the same superficial properties as water, it is not water 
because it does not have the same essential properties as the 
stuffonEarth (Putnam 129-30b). Therefore, byusingPutnam's 
example I maintain that in Katz's 'substitution problem', 
even if the functional role is fulfilled and the thing looks 
superficially like the original species, it is not and cannot be 
that species, since its essence is necessarily different. The 
origin and substance of the two species are different; there­
fore, the identity of the replacement species is different from 
that of the original species: A species cannot be replaced. 
Although on the surface this link between Katz and 
Kripke's analysis seems tenuous, it is important to under­
stand, because Kripke guarantees the identity and individu­
ality of unique beings. It follows, in Kripke's analysis, that a 
separate entity has also a separate identity and essence, since 
identity is tied up in origin and substance (Kripke 114). It is 
unique in its fundamental properties which set it away from 
and distinguish it from other entities. Although many of 
these properties may be shared with other entities (such as 
function which could be mimicked), science and philosophy 
grantthatthereissomething, anessence, thatisuniqueto that 
specific entity. It is helpful here to repeat Katz's claim that, 
II the intrinsicvalue of natural entities is their source or origin. 
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.. " (Katz 254, 249-50). These conclusions provide the base for 
a balanced ethic by privileging origin and uniqueness over 
mere "role" within an ecosystem. A combined consideration 
of all three of these properties helps locate the intrinsic and 
instrumental value of each species. 
As we have seen, by attempting to extend this principle 
to common names, Putnam also extends the analysis of 
essence. If the theory of names is applied to a collective entity 
(a species for instance), then that group should have some 
fundamental, essential property that grants it indiViduality 
and distinction. InKatz' s article this is explained as justifica­
tion for the preservation of rare species which, it seems, no 
longer have any instrumental worth in an ecosystem. Be­
cause a Panda Bear is fundamentally unlike any other spe­
cies, since it maintains its own identity and essential proper­
ties, it is intrinsic value that justifies preserving the species. 
As Katz explains, 
They have no instrumental value [supposedly], since 
the ecological system seems to function quite well 
without them. Thus, if they are to be preserved or 
protected, as environmentalist policies universally 
dictate, it must be because of their intrinsic value. 
(Katz 255) 
One concern that could arise from applying theory of 
name principles to groups is that anindividual ina group will 
lose its individuality and merely represent the 'group es­
sence' as a whole. This difference is not however lost, His,in 
part, indicated in a semantic specification - the names are 
different. Let's take the case of a herd of deer. Because they 
are a group how is it possible that each member in the group 
is a distinct individual if they do not have different names? It 
is possible if, when referring to a specific deer, we say, 'that' 
deer. 'That', in this case, is a rigid designator intended to 
indicate only one deer from the herd. 
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Another way to support Katz's search for an adequate 
environmental ethic is to examine his use of counterfactual 
worlds in view of Kripke's thought. In so doing, we can 
arrive at a theoretically-based appeal which leads to a ratio­
nale for preservation that is very similar to Katz's community 
model. Hence, Kripke's theory can inform the future devel­
opment of a feasible environmental ethic that advocates 
species preservation. 
By applying Kripke's philosophy, we come to a rather 
astonishing realization. As was mentioned earlier, because 
of the uncertainty of science necessary truths, essences, and 
essential properties cannot always be known apriori. If, then, 
there is still much to learn about relationships and essences 
and composition, any description that is not 'analytic's car­
ries with itan element of doubt. Kripke is careful to deal with 
this topic in Naming and Necessity. In a footnote he indicates 
that he did not try to deal with the delicate issues involving 
analyticity here, but does acknowledge Putnam's work 
(Kripke 122-23). Later, however, in the summary, he warns 
that, "For species, as for proper names, theway the reference 
of a term is fixed should notbe regarded as'a synonym for the 
term" (Kripke 135). 
Following this realization, we can see the danger in 
considering fixed references to be analytic truths. It is still 
true in our world that definite descriptions, descriptions 
which supposedly capture the essence of a thing or species, 
can change as our knowledge increases and develops. We 
first had to learn that water =H20. Itmay still be the case, as 
was mentioned earlier, that H20 may not be the most accu­
rate representation of water's composition. Just so, then, that 
our understanding of what constitutes a species' eSSel'lCe, is 
based on society's understanding of its chemical composi­
tion, its chromosomal makeup, and even its ecosystemic 
role.. This description, it seems, is not necessarily analytic, 
but is just a description that at least temporarily 'fixes the 
referent!. Our knowledge about a species' essence may 
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change in the future. In view of these empirical scientific 
matters, we may doubt that a successful analytic statement 
about a species in possible. 
These arguments about a species' value and its essence 
are fundamental in developing an understanding of the 
relationship between, not only a species and its role, but also 
one species with another. It is only possible, once this 
relationship is understood, to make a determination about 
the continued existence or obliteration of a unique identity. 
Although this investigation of Katz from Kripke's perspec­
tive does not neatly solve the problems surrounding species 
valuation, it informs the debate, developing the issues in 
question. If there is no way for us to 'know' what a species' 
r~al essence is, or its role is not a part of its essence, it follows 
that Kripke's theory of names could assist both the impetus 
for preservation and the justification for destruction. Preser­
vation would be based on the arguments I have illuminated 
in this essay, and destruction could be justified because of 
what is not known. There is still a personal judgment 
involved that theory can only influence, not dictate. It is, 
however, helpful to note that our understandings of a spe­
cies, as was shown above, is merely dependent upon a fixed 
referencebased upon the knowledge wehave, not the knowl­
edge we might gain. Simply, preservation need not bebased 
on an instrumental futurity because of the knowledge we 
lack or could lack - even ifwe do not consider the potential 
use-value of a species, because it is valued intrinsically by 
virtue of being naturat it seems as though it should not be 
destroyed or replaced. 
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NOTES 
1. Katz makes it clear that an ethic based solely on a 
species' intrinsic worth is equally unacceptable. It seems that 
this intrinsically valuable ethic would lead to a completely 
individualistic ethic denying species interdependency, since 
11 An entity valued intrinsically requires no relationships with 
any other entities." 
2. Italics added. 
3. Italics added. 
4. It is interesting to question Katz's meaning when he 
says 'artificially human'. For instance, is an animal that is 
conceived through artificial insemination ina zoo not consid­
ered natural because its origins are in some fundamental way 
artificial human processes? 
5. Italics added. See also p. 58 
6. A description is not a rigid designator that is just like 
a name "unless (of course) we happen to use essential prop­
erties in our description" (57). 
7. There is extensive literature which investigates these 
concerns, much of the work of Hilary Putnam, but this topic 
is for the most part beyond the scope of this paper. 
8. Kripke understood analyticity to be descriptions that 
were both necessary and a priori. 
